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HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION 
EDW ARD D. BOOTH 
Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588 
By a social welfare function, or "constitution," or "arbitration scheme," 
. "conciliation policy," or "amalgamation method," or "voting procedure," 
01 
_ Iueant a rule which associates to each profile of individual preference 
I' 
-deriJ1"S a preference ordering for the society itself. Is it possible to 
l)l b 
articulate such a social welfare function? If we demand that our social welfare 
(unction satisfy certain ethically acceptable constraints the answer to our 
yuestion is not immediately obvious. 
Kenneth Arrow, in his Social Choice and Individual Values, investigated 
the possibility of specifying a social welfare function which would satisfy 
certain socially desirable criteria. 
Antecedent to this specification Arrow demanded of the individuals in 
the society that they be, in some sense, rational. That is, the individual's 
preference profile should exhibit transitivity of preference and indifference 
and connectedness. 
Arrow's conditions imposed on the social welfare function were these: 
(1) Unrestricted Domain: The domain of the social welfare function 
should include all logically possible combinations of individual orderings. 
(2) The Pareto Principle: If all individuals in the society prefer one 
option to another or are indifferent as to these two options the social choice 
should reHect these relationships. 
(3) The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: The introduction of 
new options should not alter the preference or indifference relationships 
already established within the individual profiles. 
(4) Non-dictatorship: There is no individual such that in those situations 
in which he prefers one option to another society does likewise, regardless of 
the preferences of the other individuals. 
Arrow proved his General Impossibility Theorem: If there are at least 
three options which the members of a society consisting of at least two 
members may order then every social welfare function satisfying conditions 
11), (2) and (3) is dictatorial. 
This astonishing result provoked three kinds of responses: 
(1) Arrow's proof is Hawed and therefore a democracy satisfying the 
conditions which Arrow imposes is possible. 
(2) Arrow's proof is correct. A democracy satisfying the conditions 
which Arrow imposes is impossible. 
(3) Arrow's proof is correct but his conditions fail to capture a notion of 
a democratic society which we could still, in some sense, accept. This type of 
democracy, it is hoped, would be Arrow immune. 
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Arrow's amended presentation of the proof remains unchallenged. 
Consequently the first line of attack against the Impossibility Theorem h 
as 
been nullified. As a result pessismists were free to accept the second response 
and champion the death of democracy. 
However, recalcitrant egalitarians selected the third approach. It is With 
their general line of attack that we will be concerned. 
II. 
In 1951 Arrow wrote, "The viewpoint will be taken here that 
interpersonal comparison of utilities has no meaning and, in fact, that there is 
no meaning relevant to welfare comparisons in the measurability of individual 
utility." (Arrow, 1963:9) 
Arrow crystallized his attitude here in the form of the Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives condition. It is perhaps not immediately apparent how 
this condition restricts this sort of utility comparison. But von Neumann and 
Morgenstern demonstrated that the comparison of two options, between 
which a relationship of preference had been established, with a third option 
which was strictly irrelevant to this initial comparison leads to the 
establishment of a system of numerical utilities permitting linear transforma. 
tions. This system would permit, though it does not strictly entail, an 
interpersonal comparison of utilities. 
Given this opening Arrow's critics have attempted to show that an 
interpersonal comparison of utilities, if admitted as a condition which a social 
welfare function should fulfill, would permit a social choice system immune 
from dictatorial control. The difficulty lies in showing that an interpersonal 
comparison of utilities is meaningful. 
Ilmar Waldner's (1972: 102) efforts to establish a meaningful interperson· 
al comparison of utilities have been more serious than most. But finally he is 
compelled to confess, "My argument has been against the common 
~ssumption that it is impossible to have empirical justification for interper· 
sonal utility comparisons. I do not regard myself as having given an empirical 
justification of the required kind." 
Arrow never denied this possibility; rather what he denied was that we 
were now in the possession of such a method of utility measurement. 
But Arrow, himself, has recently admitted, "that the austerity imposed 
by this condition (the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) is stricter than 
desirable; in many situations we do have information on preferences for 
nonfeasible, i.e., irrelevant, alternatives." (Hook, 1967:19). 
At this point it might be said that Arrow himself had destroyed his own 
Impossibility Theorem by diluting one of his own conditions. Perhaps 
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ArroW'S result is not so disturbing after all. Unfortunately Schwartz 
(1970:89-106) has shattered this illusion. 
III. 
Schwartz adds four conditions to those set forth by Arrow which allow 
interpersonal comparisons of utilities and even cardinal utility comparisons. 
\ionetheless, Schwartz proves that even with these drastic alterations in the 
~onditions for a social welfare function the resultant function is either 
inconsistent or despotic. Arrow's critics have been rebuked, again. 
First we should consider two additional conditions which Schwartz 
grafts to Arrow's original ones. These so-called decisiveness conditions are 
;perative in those situations in which two options are deadlocked. It can 
occur that the sum of cardinal utilities of all the members of the society, 
excepting one individual, favoring one particular option is equal to the 
cardinal utility of that one individual who is opposed to this selection. 
Schwartz demands, by his decisiveness conditions, that should this one 
individual's selection over-ride the preference of all the others, for what 
Schwartz enigmatically refers to as "other reasons," than this unique 
individual is a despot. 
Our analysis of Schwartz's program, at least on the positive side, is that 
Schwartz, perhaps unwittingly, has uncovered another condition which we 
reasonably expect a social welfare function to fulfill - viz., "decisiveness." 
Consequently Schwartz has shown us, albeit implicitly, that we may well be 
hooked on the horns of a new dilemma. Apparently if our society is to act 
decisively it will do so only under despotic decree or if our society is to act 
democratically we are propelled towards political deadlock. 
IV. 
My proposed solution to the dilemma of despotism or deadlock can, 
here, be only roughly sketched in. My view is that it is rational for a society 
which is democratic in a broad sense to permit certain individuals to exercise, 
for "other reasons," mildly despotic powers. Of course it is well known that 
certain individuals in the most democratic societies extant exercise powers far 
in excess of those wielded by ordinary members of that society. The problem 
is, however, that the people in these societies are persuaded to believe that 
Arrow's conditions are their basic political birthright while at the same time 
silent despots steal away with the decision making power. Again it may be 
protested that what has been just described occurs with such deplorable 
frequency that a recounting of it here merely cloys. But those obsessed with 
the problem of despotism seldom explore the obverse of this situation, 
political deadlock. 
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May (1973:85-87) points out that in the United States POlitical 
deadlock, at least in the presidential elections, was an imminent danger i 
1972 and 1968. May charges that political amateurs, using an irrationalln 
conceived system, were responsible. He claims that in 1972 the DemoCrati~ 
nominating convention selected George McGovern with ample knowledge 
that McGovern could not win and that his candidacy would be detrimental to 
other party candidates. May is no mere partisan for he makes it clear that the 
Republican nominating convention committed the same blunder with their 
Goldwater nomination in 1964. 
For this reason May believes that current party moves to broaden 
participation in the nominating conventions aggravates this problem by 
opening up the conventions to more political amateurs. May's scheme to 
correct this situation is to lodge the power to nominate candidates for the 
presidency in the hands of objective party professionals. 
May proposes that party senators, congressmen, governors, top-ranking 
state legislative officials and big city mayors, either incumbent or nominee, 
from marginal or non-marginal states, be allotted from one to three 
convention votes based on an appropriate mix of these factors. Details of this 
plan aside we can now give substance to Schwartz's plea for despotic 
decisiveness based on "other reasons;" at least, for this particular case. 
Among these "other reasons" are the following. These officials are 
elected representatives. These officials have political acuity and they will 
realize that should a candidate for presidency be selected whose chances of 
winning are slim their own political fortunes may well decline with his defeat. 
Our point is simply this. We have concluded that a procedure for 
avoiding deadlock is a reasonable requirement for a political system. An 
empirical examination of our own presidential nominating conventions gives 
credence to this demand. May has suggested that a "weighing" of individuals 
involved in a social decision process will greatly reduce the danger of political 
deadlock. The general problem facing us now is to sharpen our crude notions 
of "weight" in some systematic manner. We do not assume that this task is an 
t(asy one. It may be that several particular social welfare functions are needed. 
But certainly there is a possibility of finding a social welfare function or 
functions which will accomodate both democratic and rational demands. To 
find this is the challenge. 
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